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ARTICLE 
Filling the Gap: The Retroactive Effect of 
Vacating Agency Regulations 
DANIEL H. CONRAD* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When a court vacates an agency regulation, there is a serious 
question as to whether or not the vacation should apply 
retroactively.  The practical effects of retroactive vacation are far 
ranging; however, the true legal implications of courts striking 
down agency regulations as unlawful has not been thoroughly 
vetted.1  There is significant case law and publication regarding 
the promulgation of regulations that apply retroactively, the issue 
at hand, however, is not if it is appropriate for an agency to create 
a regulation that affects the regulated community retroactively, 
but rather when an agency creates an unlawful regulation 
prospectively, what the retroactive effect of that regulation’s 
subsequent vacation by the courts should be.  The issue can be 
viewed as a fundamental question of the rule of law.  If a 
regulation is current law, how can a court decision then be 
applied retroactively to those who were following the law as it 
 
        * Daniel Conrad is the Legislative Counsel for the North Carolina 
Conservation Network.  He would like to thank Donald Hornstein, Aubrey L. 
Books Professor of Law at the UNC School of Law, for all his help over the 
years. 
 1. See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable 
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 293-94 (2003). 
1
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stood?  However, recent history and actions indicate retroactive 
application of these judicial decisions may in fact be sound policy. 
In the light of rampant midnight regulations2 and policy 
shifts caused by rapidly changing governing powers, would it be 
logical to allow inherently illegal regulations to have the rule of 
law during the period between their inception and their vacation 
by the courts?  Such a policy may only encourage the 
promulgation of invalid regulations to benefit industry and other 
interested parties as an administration prepares to leave office.  
In addition, lack of a retroactivity doctrine can cause a race to 
establish facts on the ground in order to ensure the invalid 
regulations apply.3  This means that those benefitting from 
potentially illegal regulations can race to establish their reliance 
on the regulations by laying facts on the ground prior to the 
regulation being vacated.4  Applying a court’s decision to vacate 
the regulations retroactively has the power to make such an 
action futile because the reliance on the previous regulation 
would be irrelevant. 
Recent developments regarding the regulation of mercury 
provides an excellent example of the serious nature of the 
question of retroactivity.  While climate change dominates the 
environmental landscape, an issue like mercury emissions, with 
 
 2. See John M. Broder, A Legacy Bush Can Control, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 
2007), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
9801EED6163DF93AA3575AC0A9619C8B63&pagewanted=all (“[every]  
president comes into office complaining about the 11th-hour judicial 
appointments and midnight regulations left on the White House doorstep by his 
predecessor. And every president turns around and does the same to his 
successor.”). 
 3. See generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 157-160 (1978).  
See also Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 14-25, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 
No. 108CV318, 2008 WL 7612965 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2008). 
 4. Retroactivity does not fully solve this issue as several cases exemplify. 
Once the “egg is scrambled,” so to speak, there may be no appropriate remedy. 
See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (“Normally when an agency so clearly violates the APA we would vacate 
its action—in this case its “non-rule rule”—and simply remand for the agency to 
start again. Unfortunately, because we denied preliminary relief in this case, 
the 2001 program was launched and crops were plowed under. The egg has been 
scrambled and there is no apparent way to restore the status quo ante. 
Appellants suggested that if we were to vacate, the Federal Court of Claims 
would have the responsibility of allocating damages.”). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/1
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serious health and environmental justice attributes, can fly under 
the radar.5  However, mercury poses serious health risks, and the 
lengthy history of attempts to regulate mercury represents the 
ongoing battle between industry and environmental 
organizations on how to properly regulate the toxic substance.6  
In early 2008, when the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule delisting 
mercury and other Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs) from Section 
112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA),7 and with it vacated the Bush 
Administration’s replacement Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) in 
New Jersey v. EPA,8 it left a gap of administrative law to be 
interpreted by state governments. 
The court’s vacatur of CAMR returned the mercury and other 
HAPs regulations applied to Electric Utility Steam Generating 
Units (EGUs) (including coal-fired power plants) to the status quo 
before CAMR was promulgated.  Since EGUs were reaffirmed to 
be listed under section 112(g), for a new EGU to be permitted an 
applicant is again required to analyze, select, and install 
Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) to any plant 
design; this was the case prior to CAMR.9  This much is clear 
however, the court failed to address a key point in its holding.  
What was to happen to the thirty-two power plants in thirteen 
different states that were permitted, but had yet to complete 
construction, while CAMR was presented as valid law?10  From a 
 
 5. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MERCURY IN STREAM ECOSYSTEMS (2011), 
available at   http://water.usgs.gov/nawqa/mercury/ (a recent study by the U.S. 
Geological Survey found widespread mercury contamination in the nation’s 
streams and waterways and concluded that mercury is the second leading cause 
of stream impairment throughout the nation). 
 6. See Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) for Power Plants, History, 
U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/powerplanttoxics/history.html (last 
updated July 28, 2011). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006). 
 8. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 9. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B). 
 10. Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, 32 Coal-Fired Power Plants in 
13 States Now Up in the Air After Major Court Ruling on Mercury (Feb. 28, 
2008) [hereinafter NRDC], available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/2008/ 
080228.asp (“[t]he states identified with the most coal-fired power plants now up 
in the air are: Michigan (four), Wyoming (four), Illinois (three), Nevada (three), 
Ohio (three), Pennsylvania (three), Texas (three), Iowa (two), Kentucky (two), 
Louisiana (two), Georgia (one), New Mexico (one) and North Carolina (one).  The 
ruling will impact various aspects of three dozen or more coal-fired power 
plants, including some now already under construction.  Major coal-fired power 
3
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legal standpoint, were those permits now invalid?  Is a MACT 
analysis for mercury and other HAPs now required for each EGU 
permitted while CAMR was thought to be valid law?  There is a 
split among various state departments of environment and the 
entities responsible for permitting EGUs concerning these 
questions.  There is even a split within states in some 
circumstances; other states simply do not know what they are 
now required to do for those plants.11 
A perfect example of the severity of this issue is the Cliffside 
power plant, currently under construction in western North 
Carolina.  The proposed construction of a new 825 megawatt 
(MW) facility at Duke Energy’s Cliffside site has ignited 
controversy on both a local and national level.  Locally, citizens 
object to the construction of another coal plant that could emit 
dangerous toxins and threaten public health.12  On the national 
level, the issues encompass not only public health, but climate 
change and energy policy as a whole.  The construction of new 
coal plants as opposed to investing in renewable energy sources is 
seen by many as a slap in the face to curbing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and pushing towards a clean energy economy. 
The Cliffside plant received its air permits in 2007 while 
CAMR was still considered good law, but after the lawsuit 
 
plants impacted by the ruling include: LS Power White Pine (1500 MW - permit 
pending in Nevada); Sierra Ely (1500 MW - permit pending in Nevada); Toquop 
(850 MW - permit pending in Nevada) Desert Rock (Sithe Global’s 1500 MW in 
New Mexico); Longleaf (LS Power’s 1200 MW Plant in Georgia); Cliffside (Duke 
Energy’s 800 MW Plant in North Carolina); Alliant Marshalltown (600 MW – 
permit pending in Iowa); LS Power Waterloo (750 MW – permit pending in 
Iowa); AMP (1000 MW – permit challenged in Ohio); LS Power/Dynegy (750 MW 
in Michigan).”). 
 11. See Letter from Keith Overcash, Dir., Div. of Air Quality, N.C. Dept. of 
Env. & Nat. Res., to Rich M. Roper, Manager, Cliffside Steam Station Duke 
Energy Carolinas LLC (June 2, 2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/ 
permits/psd/docs/cliffside/Letter_Regarding_Cliffside_MACTs.pdf (“There is an 
ongoing national debate over the impact of the decision.  In particular, opinions 
differ about whether the ruling affects a previously issued permit under which 
construction has begun but is not completed.”); See also NRDC, supra note 10. 
 12. See generally Stop Cliffside Construction: New Legal Challenge by NC 
Warn, N.C. WASTE AWARENESS & REDUCTION NETWORK [WARN] (May 5, 2009), 
http://www.ncwarn.org/2009/05/stop-cliffside-construction-nc-warn-tells-
utilities-commision-news-release/; See also Citizens Gather for Biggest NC 
Climate Action in 2 Decades!, SOUTHERN ENERGY NETWORK BLOG (Apr. 19, 2009), 
http://southeastenergy.wordpress.com/2009/04/19/citizens-gather-for-biggest-nc-
climate-action-in-2-decades/. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/1
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challenging it had been filed.  After seeing the oral arguments in 
New Jersey v. EPA, Duke Energy raced to begin construction of 
the plant (getting their facts on the ground in the event of a 
challenge).  That way, if the regulations were vacated, they could 
claim they had already begun construction.  Just nine days after 
ground was broken at the Cliffside site, the holding in New Jersey 
v. EPA was delivered, vacating CAMR.  Yet, Duke Energy claims 
that because they had commenced construction prior to the 
ruling, they can apply the mercury standard in CAMR (a 
standard ruled illegal because it did not adequately protect public 
health), as well as not conduct the MACT analysis required after 
the CAMR vacation.13  The Supreme Court has rejected this 
“facts on the ground” rationale in regard to applying recently 
promulgated statutes to already commenced projects of 
significant investment, specifically with the Endangered Species 
Act.14  However, it remains to be seen how this argument applies 
to the vacatur of agency regulations. 
A federal judge in the Western District of North Carolina 
recently ruled against Duke Energy, ordering that Duke Energy 
must conduct a MACT analysis for mercury and other HAPs at 
the Cliffside site.15  Duke Energy has since appealed this ruling 
and, in addition, successfully sought to reclassify the Cliffside 
unit as a minor source. This is another action that would preclude 
them from conducting the proper mercury emissions analysis 
 
 13. Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 3, at 3-14 
 14. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 168-170 (1978).  In the Tellico 
Dam case, Tennessee Valley Authority argued that because the provisions of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) provided that they protect the species at all 
costs, and that the listing of the snail darter as an endangered species occurred 
after significant construction had been completed on the Dam and the 
alternative to completion would result in significant losses, that the injunction 
on construction and application of the statute to them was unjust and should 
not be allowed.  The Supreme Court rejected this argument.  The Court 
acknowledged that abandoning the dam “will produce results requiring the 
sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of many million dollars in 
public funds.”  However, the Court affirmed the appellate court decision that 
“current project status cannot be translated into a workable standard of judicial 
review.  Whether a dam is 50% or 90% completed is irrelevant in calculating the 
social and scientific costs attributable to the disappearance of a unique form of 
life.” 
 15. S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. Civ. 
108CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97485 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008). 
5
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required for major sources; it rendered the appeal moot, save an 
issue of attorney’s fees.16 
The Cliffside case touches on many issues: public health, the 
environment, global warming, hazardous air pollutants, 
industry’s power in politics, fairness, and rule of law.  All of these 
issues hinge on the retroactive effect of the vacatur of agency 
actions.  To dissect the true effect of vacatur on administrative 
regulations, and the time period when they were believed to be 
valid, this article will examine several aspects of both 
environmental regulations and administrative law.  First, the 
article will examine the governing case law regarding vacatur.  
This analysis will include case law defining vacatur and 
retroactivity, as well as retroactive application of decisions.  Since 
this article is focused on the retroactive nature of a judicial 
vacatur, it will not explore the more traditional case law 
surrounding promulgating regulations that apply retroactively 
and the different types of retroactivity associated with that 
practice.17  It will also look at options other than vacatur as a 
remedy available to the court and how these may shed light on 
the implications of vacating a regulation.  Second, to show the 
practical effect of this analysis, this article will look specifically at 
the reasoning in the New Jersey v. EPA decision that vacated 
CAMR.  This will include an examination of the reasons behind 
mercury and other HAPs regulations, which shows the 
importance of the issue and a real life application of the 
retroactivity doctrine.  This article will examine a recent federal 
decision, the Cliffside power plant case discussed earlier, which 
covers this exact issue as the petitioners argued that Duke 
Energy was in direct violation of the CAA by continuing 
construction with a permit that relied on the since-vacated CAMR 
regulations.18  It will establish whether or not it is consistent 
with the interpretation of the law presented in the earlier 
 
 16. See Press Release, N.C. Dept of Env. and Nat. Res., DENR Responds to 
Court Order for Expedited Decision on Cliffside HAP Emissions (Mar. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.ncconservationnetwork.org/documents/ 
cliffsideHAPSfinal.pdf; see also Bruce Henderson, Federal Cliffside Lawsuit 
Dismissed, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (July 3, 2009), http://www.istockanalyst.com 
/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/3330813. 
 17. See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
 18. See S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. 
1:08CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97485 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/1
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sections.  Finally, the article will explore the positive and 
negative policy implications of such a retroactive effect as applied 
to administrative regulations. 
There is strong support for the assertion that the decision in 
New Jersey v. EPA should be applied retroactively.  The definition 
of “vacate” in the D.C. Circuit’s case law refers to returning to the 
status quo, voiding and starting anew as if the regulation never 
existed.19  The Supreme Court has defined the retroactive nature 
of a decision as: 
[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties 
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law 
and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on 
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such 
events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.20 
The Supreme Court has also identified criteria that must be 
established to avoid the default retroactive application of a 
ruling, none of which appear to be met in the current fact 
patterns.21  The D.C. Circuit has applied these rulings to 
administrative law decisions, similar to N.J. v. EPA.22  
Additionally, there is case law supporting the notion that when a 
vacated law was relied on, the result of this reliance could be 
challenged and overturned.23 
The facts that the D.C. Circuit had several options for 
remedy, other than vacating CAMR, and that prospective-only 
decisions are uncommon in administrative cases,24 add weight to 
the claim that the holding should apply retroactively.  The 
rationale for several of these unexercised options is to avoid the 
 
 19. See Envtl. Def. v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also 
Action on Smoking & Health v. Civ. Aero. Bd., 713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
 20. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). 
 21. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 759 (1995). 
 22. See Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 59 
F.3d 1281, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 23. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (vacating the 
RCRA “mixture rule” that had been law for almost ten years); See also United 
States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(overturning prior convictions that were based in part possibly on the “mixture 
rule” which was vacated post-conviction). 
 24. Levin, supra note 1, at 359. 
7
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negative consequences and disruption caused by vacating a law, 
and to provide a proper remedy when no retroactive remedy is 
available due to the existence of irreversible actions occurring in 
reliance on the vacated regulation.25  Finally, from a policy 
standpoint, it would not make sense to allow agencies to make 
illegal regulations and have them stand as good law during the 
period prior to being vacated.  The Cliffside example illuminates 
this point given the public health concerns governing the 
regulation of mercury and HAPs in general. 
II.  DOES A VACATUR OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCY REGULATIONS APPLY 
RETROACTIVELY? 
A. Case Law Defining Vacatur 
When the D.C. Circuit vacated the CAMR, it did not describe 
what the effect of vacating the rule would be.  The D.C. Circuit 
handles almost all of the cases that seek to invalidate an agency 
regulation.26  To determine the D.C. Circuit’s intent when 
vacating a rule, we must first look to the definition of “vacate” as 
used by the D.C. Circuit, and then analyze the possible 
retroactive effects of vacating regulations. 
The D.C. Circuit has defined “vacate” in several instances.  In 
Environmental Defense v. Leavitt, the D.C. Circuit stated: “[w]hen 
a court vacates an agency’s rules, the vacatur restores the status 
quo before the invalid rule took effect and the agency must 
initiate another rulemaking proceeding if it would seek to 
confront the problem anew.”27  The Court in Leavitt goes on to 
 
 25. See Allied Signal Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 
153 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla v. Veneman, 289 
F.3d 89, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 
747, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (choosing not to vacate because there is no way to 
restore the “status quo ante”). 
 26. See HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES, UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 13 (2011), available at 
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL%20-%20RPP%20-
%20Handbook%202006%20Rev%202007/$FILE/handbook20091201rev20091106
.pdf 
 27. Envtl. Def. v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/1
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state that when the regulations were vacated, EPA was placed in 
a situation where it had failed to meet its duty to promulgate 
regulations by the required date, despite the fact that it had 
promulgated regulations prior to the statutorily granted 
deadline.28  Application of this definition to the New Jersey v. 
EPA decision results in a restoration of the status quo for 
mercury and HAPs regulation, and thus requires a case-by-case 
MACT analysis before a permit can be issued for the construction 
of a power plant. 
The D.C. Circuit definition of “vacate” does not explain what 
happens to permits and already-commenced constructions that 
rely upon the vacated rule.  Further definitions, however, make it 
clear that vacating a regulation should make it seem as if it never 
had existed and restore the status quo ante.29  Taken literally, 
returning to the status quo ante would not only invalidate the 
regulations but also actions that relied upon the illegal 
regulation, since these actions would not have occurred or been 
permissible had the regulation not existed.  However, this line of 
reasoning is not directly discussed in these definitions.  Before 
one can assert that vacating a regulation that was previously 
relied upon has the consequence that the reliance is invalid as 
well, one must look further than the case law defining “vacate” 
and delve into case law determining the retroactive effects of a 
holding. 
B. Supreme Court View of Retroactive Application of 
Court Decisions 
A series of Supreme Court decisions have addressed exactly 
how court decisions apply retroactively, the implications caused 
by such retroactivity, and the possibility of retroactive court 
 
 28. Id. at 65. 
 29. See Action on Smoking & Health v. Civ. Aero. Bd., 713 F.2d 795, 797 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[t]o vacate, as the parties should well know, means to annul; 
to cancel or rescind; to declare, to make, or to render, void; to defeat; to deprive 
of force; to make of no authority or validity; to set aside. Thus, by vacating or 
rescinding the recessions proposed by ER-1245, the judgment of this court had 
the effect of reinstating the rules previously in force.”); see also Sugar Cane 
Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also 
Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (choosing not to 
vacate because there is no way to restore the “status quo ante”). 
9
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holdings causing detrimental repercussions.  The case law has 
changed dramatically over the last forty years. 
a. Chevron Oil v. Hunson 
The Supreme Court addressed the retroactive potential of a 
decision in 1971 in Chevron Oil Co. v Hunson.  In this case, a 
worker was injured while working on an offshore drill off the 
coast of Louisiana.30  After waiting several years, he sued 
Chevron Oil using admiralty laws as the authority for the suit.31  
During the discovery phase of the lawsuit, the Supreme Court 
announced its holding in the case of Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Co.32  The Rodrigue holding changed the 
interpretation of a particular act, making the admiralty laws no 
longer applicable in Hunson’s case.  Instead, Louisiana state laws 
would now govern such an action.33  The Louisiana laws carried a 
one-year statute of limitations, which would have lapsed prior to 
the suit being filed by Hunson.34 
To decide whether or not the ruling would apply 
retroactively, as they acknowledged most do, the Supreme Court 
used a three-factor test.  For a holding not to be applied 
retroactively, the factors considered included whether: (1) the 
decision established a new principle of law by either overruling 
clear past precedent or deciding an issue of first impression not 
easily foreseen; (2) the prior history and purpose of the rule in 
question should be examined, while questioning if retroactive 
application of the decision will further retard its operation; and 
(3) the inequity caused by retroactive application must be 
examined.35  In this case, the Supreme Court found that Rodrigue 
was a case of first impression, overturning a long line of D.C. 
Circuit’s case law stating that the use of admiralty laws was 
proper.  Additionally, the goal of the act under interpretation was 
to provide “comprehensive and familiar remedies” to individuals 
 
 30. Chevron Oil Co. v. Hunson, 404 U.S. 97, 98-100 (1971). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 99. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 106-107. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/1
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such as Hunson.36  Retroactive application of the ruling in this 
case would defeat this purpose by denying Hunson a remedy.  
Finally, Hunson would have a great deal of inequity placed upon 
him if the ruling was applied retroactively in this case.37 
This type of selective application of retroactivity of a holding 
on a case-by-case basis has since been disallowed in subsequent 
cases.38  However, since the factors represent the most lenient 
standard by which the Supreme Court would allow a decision to 
not be retroactive unless explicitly stated, it is interesting to 
apply these factors to the facts of the permitted EGUs.  New 
Jersey v. EPA did not overrule clear past precedent. It is possible 
it may have been viewed as a case of first impression, but, given 
the close proximity of the permits being granted (most less than 
two years from their issue date), as well as the possibility that the 
D.C. Circuit’s holding may have been “clearly foreshadowed,” this 
factor is negated.39 
Second, the purpose of the CAA is “to protect and enhance 
the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the 
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its 
population.”40  A prospective ruling that would allow a power 
plant to be built that did not meet the requisite regulation levels 
for mercury and other HAPs deemed necessary for public health 
and safety would not advance this purpose.  Finally, permitted 
constructors would have an inequity argument that the 
retroactive application would hurt them, since their plans and 
construction relied on the old rule.  However, when weighed with 
the public health inequity argument that improper levels of 
mercury and HAPs would be applied to EGUs, threatening public 
health if the decision is not applied retroactively, the EGU 
owner’s inequity argument may not be as strong as originally 
thought. 
In its entirety, it seems a strong possibility that when the 
three factor test for non-retroactivity set out in Chevron Oil is 
applied to EGUs permitted post-CAMR but prior to the ruling in 
New Jersey. v. EPA, the holding would be determined to have a 
 
 36. Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 107-108. 
 37. Id. at 108. 
 38. See infra Part II-B-b and c. 
 39. Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 106. 
 40. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). 
11
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retroactive effect.  While this analysis is useful because the 
Chevron Oil standard presents the most leniency in determining 
that a holding will not have a retroactive effect, recent case law 
makes the application of this test unnecessary to reach the same 
result. 
b. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia 
The first major case limiting the application of the Chevron 
Oil factors is James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.41  In this 
case, a law taxing out-of-state liquor disproportionally from in-
state liquor was found to violate the Commerce Clause, but the 
decision was only applied prospectively; the James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. sued to get back the disproportionate taxes they 
had paid in reliance on the invalidated law.42  The lower state 
courts relied on the Chevron Oil factors and claimed that the new 
rule should only be applied prospectively43.  The Supreme Court’s 
reasoning divided holdings into three categories: (1) those that 
apply completely retroactively; (2) those that apply solely 
prospectively; and (3) those that are applied selectively 
prospective due to an increased burden or reliance, sometimes 
referred to by the court as a modified prospective ruling.44  The 
Court acknowledged in its decision that applying a holding as 
fully retroactive was “overwhelmingly the norm.”45 
The state tax law in question in this case was deemed invalid 
due to the ruling in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias.46  In Bacchus, 
a Hawaiian tax, similar to the Georgia tax law in question, had 
been struck down and the ruling was applied retroactively.47  
This placed the ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court—that the 
Beam ruling should be applied prospectively due to the Chevron 
Oil factors—in the third modified prospective category since the 
rule relied upon had been applied retroactively elsewhere.  The 
Supreme Court here found that selective prospectivity is not 
 
 41. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
 42. Id. at 533-43. 
 43. Id. at 529. 
 44. Id. at 535-37. 
 45. Id. at 535. 
 46. Id. at 539. 
 47. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 539. 
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allowable and the Chevron Oil factors should not have been 
applicable.48 
Selective prospectivity was disallowed in criminal cases in 
Griffith v. Kentucky.49  In its analysis, the Court, speaking of the 
Bacchus ruling, stated that “[i]n most decisions of this Court, 
retroactivity both as to choice of law and as to remedy goes 
without saying.”50  The Court held that: 
[o]nce retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new 
rule, it is chosen for all others who might seek its prospective 
application. The applicability of rules of law is not to be switched 
on and off according to individual hardship; allowing relitigation 
of choice-of-law issues would only compound the challenge to the 
stabilizing purpose of precedent posed in the first instance by the 
very development of “new” rules. Of course, the generalized 
enquiry permits litigants to assert, and the courts to consider, 
the equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but 
similarly situated. Conversely, nothing we say here precludes 
consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial 
issues in particular cases.51 
c.  Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation 
The decision in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation 
solidifies the opinion in Beam and narrows the possibility of 
prospective holdings even more.52  Harper involved a Virginia tax 
that was deemed unconstitutional in Davis v. Michigan 
Department of Treasury.53  The Virginia Supreme Court struck 
down the law in light of the Davis holding, but refused to issue 
refunds for taxes that were collected in reliance on the 
unconstitutional law because they claimed they could still apply 
Chevron Oil in spite of Beam.54  The Virginia Supreme Court 
claimed that Davis had made no specific ruling as to whether it 
was to be applied retroactively or prospectively, and that Beam 
 
 48. Id. at 540. 
 49. Griffith v. United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 50. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 538. 
 51. Id. at 543-544. 
 52. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
 53. Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989). 
 54. Harper, 509 U.S. at 91-92. 
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would only apply if Davis had been applied retroactively.55  The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and instead posited that: 
When this Court does not reserve the question of whether its 
holding should be applied to the parties before it, however, an 
opinion is properly understood to have followed the normal rule 
of retroactive application and must be read to hold that its rule 
should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the 
Court.56 
The Court restated and solidified the new rule first 
addressed in Beam, holding that: 
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before 
it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and 
must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on 
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such 
events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule. . . . In 
both civil and criminal cases, we can scarcely permit the 
substantive law [to] shift and spring according to the particular 
equities of [individual parties’] claims of actual reliance on an old 
rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the new rule.57 
It is important to note that this case law applies to Supreme 
Court decisions and does not reference District Court decisions 
such as New Jersey v. EPA or agency actions. However, when 
speaking about the Beam decision, the Supreme Court 
unequivocally stated “a rule of federal law, once announced and 
applied to the parties to the controversy, must be given full 
retroactive effect by all courts adjudicating federal law.”58 
d. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde 
In Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde,59 the Supreme Court 
addressed an Ohio decision claiming that although a tolling 
statute allowing unlimited time to sue for lawsuits against out-of-
state defendants was found unconstitutional in Bendix Autolite 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 97-98 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 57. Id. at 97 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 96. 
 59. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995). 
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Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.,60 it would still apply to tort 
claims “accrued before that decision.”61  The petitioner, Hyde, 
argued not that Harper should not apply, but that the decision to 
allow the tort claims to continue should be looked at “not through 
the lens of retroactivity but through that of remedy,” and that 
states have a “degree of legal leeway in fashioning remedies for 
constitutional ills.”62  While finding this argument clever, the 
Supreme Court did not find it legitimate.63  Hyde pointed to cases 
that she thought allowed state courts to avoid retroactivity by 
denying a particular remedy.  For example, in some tax cases, 
states could choose to either give a refund, or impose a back tax 
on those who paid disproportionally less as a result of the struck 
down rule.64  The Supreme Court clarified the issue, identifying 
four circumstances under which a new rule in case law may not 
determine the outcome of a pending case to which it is being 
applied retroactively: 
[A] court may find (1) an alternative way of curing the 
constitutional violation, or (2) a previously existing, independent 
legal basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying 
relief, or (3) as in the law of qualified immunity, a well-
established general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law, 
which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other 
significant policy justifications, or (4) a principle of law, such as 
that of “finality” present in the Teague context, that limits the 
principle of retroactivity itself.65 
Since none of these were claimed by Hyde or applied to the facts 
of Hyde, the Court held simply that the Harper ruling applies and 
a court cannot escape the retroactive result at the remedial 
stage.66 
 
 60. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988). 
 61. Hyde, 514 U.S. at 750-751. 
 62. Id. at 752. 
 63. See generally id. at 752-754 (discussing Hyde’s arguments). 
 64. Id. at 755. 
 65. Id. (the Teague doctrine applies to habeas corpus petitioners where the 
Court has found that a habeas petitioner cannot obtain a habeas corpus remedy 
where doing so requires the habeas court to apply retroactively a new rule of 
criminal law). 
 66. Id. 
15
  
16 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
C. The Circuit Court’s interpretation of retroactivity and 
prior reliance on vacated law 
The Supreme Court’s opinion of the retroactive effect of its 
decisions appears very clear from the above case law.  It would be 
sensible to apply this general default assumption of retroactivity 
to the New Jersey v. EPA decision, especially in light of the fact 
that the D.C. Circuit did not hold that the decision should be 
applied prospectively, and that selective case-by-case prospective 
application has been disallowed.67  However, all of this case law 
applies to Supreme Court decisions and to constitutional issues, 
not to circuit court holdings and administrative regulations 
governed by statute.  Since the D.C. Circuit oversaw the matter, 
its interpretation is especially relevant when attempting to 
determine its intent when vacating CAMR. 
a. National Fuel Gas Supply Corp v. F.E.R.C. 
The D.C. Circuit addressed both of the above mentioned 
concerns in National Fuel Gas Supply Corp v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission.68  At issue here was a Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) order that allowed local 
distribution companies (LDCs) to reduce their contractual 
commitments to suppliers.69  The order was vacated in American 
Gas Distributors v. FERC.70  National Fuel challenged the 
retroactive application of this ruling, claiming that they had 
relied on the order to reduce their contract and were unfairly 
prejudiced by the retroactive effect of the ruling.  They could have 
taken other actions, such as converting parts of the contract to 
cover transportation costs, had they known the order was 
invalid.71  FERC initially did a Chevron Oil three-factor analysis 
and switched its ruling several times on the retroactive effect.72  
It finally determined that the same remedy, “payment to it by 
 
 67. See supra Part II-B-b and c. 
 68. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 59 F.3d 
1281 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 69. Id. at 1282. 
 70. Associated Gas Distrib.v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 824 F.2d 981 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 71. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 59 F.3d at 1286. 
 72. See id. at 1284-86. 
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National Fuel of the full demand charges associated with its CD 
reduction” would be required whether the case was viewed under 
the “Beam and Harper principles of retroactivity or at the initial 
choice-of-law level under the third prong of the Chevron Oil 
analysis.”73 
The D.C. Circuit came to the same result but by different 
reasoning in light of the recent holding in Hyde.  It applied Hyde 
and summed up the retroactivity analysis surmising that after 
Hyde, only the “the most compelling circumstances” would allow a 
court to use reliance as a reason to depart from the “norm of 
retroactive application.”74  The court concluded that: 
[W]hatever the continuing validity of Chevron Oil after [Harper] 
and [Hyde], there is not the sort of grave disruption or inequity 
involved in awarding retrospective relief to this petitioner that 
would bring that doctrine into play.”). Hence, if Harper is 
applicable here, then we do not need to consider whether the 
Commission properly applied Chevron Oil; we need only consider 
whether any of the four circumstances identified in Hyde might 
apply here.75 
The court furthered its decision by applying the holdings on 
retroactivity to agencies as well.  In its reasoning, the court could 
find no rationale for why such decisions and their logic would 
apply to judicial decisions and not agencies.76  In explaining this 
decision, the court discussed why an Article III court decision77 
should be given a retroactive effect: 
Because the decision of an Article III court, however, announces 
the law as though [it] were finding it discerning what the law is, 
rather than decreeing what it is . . . changed to, or what it will 
tomorrow be, all parties charged with applying that decision, 
whether agency or court, state or federal, must treat it as if it 
had always been the law. The agency must give retroactive effect 
 
 73. Id. at 1286. 
 74. Id. at 1288. 
 75. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 1289 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 77. An Article III court decision refers to a decision made by a judicial body 
established by Article III of the U. S. Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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to the ruling of a federal court because of the nature of that 
court.78 
The court then compared this reasoning to the reasoning barring 
an Article III court from applying an advisory decision or one that 
does not apply evenly and justly to all citizens but singles 
individuals out discriminately.79  The court concluded that “[i]n 
sum, the decision of a federal court must be given retroactive effect 
regardless whether it is being applied by a court or an agency.”80 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit established that the reliance issue 
and factors of Chevron Oil were not to be considered, stating: 
National seeks an evidentiary hearing so that it can present 
evidence in support of its arguments about reliance. Even if 
National were able to show that it relied to its detriment upon 
the CD reduction provision, however, the Commission would not 
have the discretion to deny Tennessee the remedy of retroactive 
vacatur of National’s CD reduction. Therefore, we need not 
consider whether the Commission erred by refusing to hold a 
hearing.81 
b. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA and United States v. Goodner 
Bros. Aircraft, Inc. 
Shell Oil Co. v. EPA82 and United States v. Goodner Bros. 
Aircraft, Inc.83 occurred prior to the Harper and Hyde decisions.  
However, they rely on Beam, and provide an example of the 
process when a rule that was relied upon is vacated and then 
action is taken following the vacation of the rule.  In Shell Oil, 
the court vacated the “mixture rule” promulgated by EPA in its 
regulations under RCRA; the “mixture rule” had been considered 
valid law for almost ten years.84  The D.C. Circuit stated “we 
 
 78. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 59 F.3d at 1289 (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at 1290-91. 
 82. Shell Oil Co v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 83. United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 
1992). 
 84. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d at 765. 
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vacate these rules and remand them to the agency.”85  In New 
Jersey v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit used similar language to vacate 
CAMR by holding that “the court must vacate CAMR’s new 
source performance standards and remand them to EPA for 
reconsideration.”86  Neither ruling expresses an opinion on the 
retroactive effect of the vacation.  However, following the Shell 
ruling, the defendants in Goodner appealed to overturn their 
conviction for RCRA violations, since the conviction had been 
based in part on the vacated “mixture rule.”87 
The Eighth Circuit directly addressed the question of 
whether the vacation of the rule would subject prior actions (that 
relied upon the rule) to reversal and invalidity due to the 
retroactivity of the Shell decision, despite the fact that the D.C. 
Circuit did not directly address this matter in its holding in Shell.  
The court stated in its analysis of this issue that: 
Under James B. Beam Distilling, full retroactive effect must be 
given to a new rule of civil law when the new rule is applied to 
the litigants in the case in which the rule was announced.  The 
court in Shell Oil did not expressly reserve the question of 
retroactivity or of whether its holding should apply to the parties 
before it. On the contrary, it declined to reach the substantive 
arguments of the petitioner regarding the mixture rule because it 
had vacated the mixture rule. If the court had not applied the 
invalidation of the mixture rule to the parties before it, it would 
have been required to reach the substantive arguments. Under 
James B. Beam Distilling and consistent with the meaning of the 
word “vacate,” we find that invalidation of the mixture rule 
applies retroactively.88 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in New Jersey v. EPA did not reach the 
other arguments of the petitioners because they had vacated the 
rule and further analysis was moot.89  The Goodner court 
concluded that “[b]ased upon the invalidation of the federal 
mixture rule, we reverse the district court and remand so that the 
verdicts on counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 may be set aside and a new trial 
 
 85. Id.   
 86. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 87. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 384-85. 
 88. Id. at 385 (internal citations omitted). 
 89. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 584. 
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held.”90  This analysis could be applied directly to the EGUs 
permitted post-CAMR and prior to CAMR being vacated. 
Further arguments were not addressed in Shell Oil because 
the rule was vacated.  The Eighth Circuit in Goodner found that 
the Shell Oil vacation by the D.C. Circuit had retroactive effects 
and overturned prior convictions that relied on the vacated 
regulation.91  The D.C. Circuit also vacated CAMR, and again 
made no analysis of the further claims due to the vacation of the 
regulation, and again made no statement to the retroactivity of 
the decision.  In addition, the Supreme Court has since 
strengthened the presumption of retroactivity in Harper and 
Hyde.  Thus, it appears given these circumstances there is a very 
strong argument that the D.C. Circuit intended the effects of 
vacating CAMR to be retroactive regardless of any reliance upon 
it. 
D. Other Sources on Judicial Administrative Remedies: 
As discussed, there is very little in the way of scholarly works 
regarding available judicial remedies and their effect when a 
court finds an agency regulation unlawful.92  There is even less 
regarding the specific topic at hand, the retroactive nature of a 
vacatur of such regulations.  While there are ample articles and 
case law regarding the legality of promulgating regulations with 
a retroactive effect, this topic is separate from the matter at 
hand, concerning whether a vacatur will jeopardize actions in the 
past that relied upon the now-nonexistent regulations.  Despite 
this void, there are a few works that address aspects of the topic 
and help to shed light on the subject, including potential options a 
court has when reviewing agency actions.  The works discussed 
below focus on the emergence of the court’s option to remand 
without vacatur, a practice which is examined further in detail 
below.93 
In Vacation at Sea, Ronald Levin explores the purpose, and 
the historical use of remand without vacatur, ultimately 
concluding that the practice is a beneficial remedy for the courts 
 
 90. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 385. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Levin, supra note 1, at 293-94. 
 93. See infra Part II-E. 
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to implement.94  Levin describes remand without vacatur as “[a] 
court’s decision, after full consideration, to pronounce an agency 
action illegal, but to allow the action to continue in effect 
anyway.”95  Levin examines the legality of remand without 
vacatur within the confines of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),96 and also looks at what objections to the practice may be 
raised.97  Most notably, Levin addresses the “rise of retroactivity 
in judicial decisions” as a justification for remand without 
vacatur, stating: 
[e]ven if the Supreme Court were to extend its ‘retroactivity of 
judicial holdings’ case law to its logical terminus by overruling 
Chevron Oil completely, appellate practice in regulatory contexts 
might not be affected very profoundly because prospective-only 
judicial decisions have not been very common in administrative 
cases anyway.98 
Levin concludes that remand without vacatur “has enabled the 
courts to temper their relief in administrative cases so as to avoid 
disruptions, effect [sic] smooth transitions, and maintain the 
continuity of regulatory measures that protect the public.”99 
In Remanding without Vacating Agency Action, Brian Prestes 
follows the historical rise of remand without vacatur as an 
alternative to vacating regulations.100  Prestes describes the 
rationale for this shift in standard as follows: 
Because agencies tackle complex problems and because agency 
action can be challenged in many ways and from many 
directions, proponents argue that agencies should be permitted to 
present new evidence responding to challengers’ attacks when it 
appears that the agency could likely do so when the adverse 
consequences of vacation are likely to be significant.101 
 
 94. See generally Levin, supra note 1. 
 95. Id. at 295. 
 96. Id. at 305-15. 
 97. Id. at 345. 
 98. Id. at 358-59. 
 99. Id. at 385-86. 
 100. See Brian S. Prestes, Remanding without Vacating Agency Action, 32 
SETON HALL L. REV. 108, 111-15 (2001). 
 101. Id. at 123. 
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Prestes also discusses the controversial legal authority behind 
remand without vacatur and the history of the APA, before 
concluding, opposite to Levin, that the practice is unlawful, 
stating: “the text of the APA, along with the legislative history, 
statutory purpose, canons of construction, and judicial precedent 
demonstrate the illegality of remanding without vacating.”102 
In We’ve Only Just Begun, Daniel Rodriguez again examines 
judicial administrative remedies from the viewpoint of the 
emergence of remand without vacatur.103  Rodriguez points to the 
pros and cons of the new remedy created by the judiciary, 
pointing to less damage done by the ruling as a positive, and 
increased judicial activism as a negative.104  Rodriguez discusses 
the effects of vacatur of agency regulations in his work, stating: 
“[v]acatur, on its own terms, has no necessary connection to the 
remedy of remand.  Vacatur obliterates the agency decision.”105  
While Rodriguez acknowledges the problematic effects of vacatur, 
he ultimately concludes that the development and use of remand 
without vacatur in its place is potentially as problematic.106 
In An Article I, Section 7 Perspective on Administrative Law 
Remedies, Boris Bershteyn uses game theory to analyze the 
different remedies available when reviewing administrative 
agency actions.107  Bershteyn argues in favor of vacating agency 
regulations and against remand without vacatur as a remedy; 
because the former would force Congress to legislate with 
increased specificity, and as shown through game theory models 
this is a desirable effect.108  In his analysis Bershteyn discusses 
how a bar on the promulgation of retroactive rulemaking, unless 
explicitly authorized, has pushed the courts towards remand 
without vacatur; ultimately he concludes that the fears that 
pushed courts towards that remedy are unfounded, stating that 
 
 102. Id. at 151. 
 103. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, We’ve Only Just Begun: The Impact of 
Remand Orders From Higher to Lower Courts on American Jurisprudence: Of 
Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in 
Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599 (2004). 
 104. Id. at 635-37. 
 105. Id. at 611. 
 106. Id. at 635-37. 
 107. See generally Boris Bershteyn, An Article I, Section 7 Perspective on 
Administrative Law Remedies, 114 YALE. L.J. 359 (2004). 
 108. Id. at 404. 
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“the main risk of vacating the rule is not an overly disruptive 
default policy, but an insufficiently responsive legislature.”109 
While much of the literature on administrative remedies 
surrounds remand without vacatur and does not directly address 
the issue at hand, much can be implicitly gained from these 
analyses.  First, the authors all acknowledge the disruptive effect 
of vacating a regulation.  Second, the practice, while disputed, is 
clearly established.  Third, as discussed in the next section, 
although the option was available to them, the D.C. Circuit chose 
not remand without vacatur but to vacate CAMR entirely in New 
Jersey v. EPA. 
E.  D.C. Circuit had other available options than to Vacate 
The case law analysis above110 is strengthened by the fact 
that the D.C. Circuit had other options to settle the case and 
avoid retroactivity, had it not intended a vacation of CAMR to 
have a retroactive effect.  The court could have ruled that the 
decision applied prospectively, thus negating the default of 
retroactivity.  The court also could have withheld the issuance of 
its mandate to allow problems presented by the vacatur to be 
sorted out.111 
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit itself has developed a 
procedure known as “remand without vacatur”—discussed in 
much of the literature above112 —to avoid the issues involved in 
vacating a regulation and its retroactive effect.  The D.C. Circuit 
first applied this approach in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.113  It identified the criteria to apply this 
device instead of vacating, stating that it “depends on [1] the 
 
 109. Id. at 309. 
 110. See supra Part II-B and C. 
 111. See Indep. U.S Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (“[w]e vacate the rule because the Secretary's omissions are quite serious 
and raise considerable doubt about which of the proposed alternatives would 
best serve the objectives set out in the Merchant Marine Act. Yet we exercise 
our power to withhold issuance of our mandate until July 16, 1987, to avoid 
further disruptions in the domestic market and to allow the Secretary to 
undertake further proceedings to address the problems of the merchant marine 
trade.”). 
 112. See supra Part II-D. 
 113. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 146 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of 
doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and [2] the disruptive 
consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.”114 
The fact that the D.C. Circuit decided not to employ these 
numerous other options at its disposal is further evidence that it 
intended the vacation of CAMR to have retroactive results.  The 
D.C. Circuit case law shows that it is well aware of the issues 
involved and the disruptive effects when a rule is vacated.  The 
reasoning of its decisions to remand without vacatur frequently 
indicates that the court did not solely vacate specifically in order 
to avoid these effects, an option they did not exercise in New 
Jersey v. EPA.115 
Finally, in certain cases, the D.C. Circuit has used remand 
without vacatur instead of vacatur in instances where the 
retroactivity of a vacation results in remedies that cannot be 
satisfied due to past actions.  The court stated that the “egg has 
been scrambled,” implying that it cannot be unscrambled as a 
remedy; vacation is therefore inappropriate, because courts would 
 
 114. Id. at 150-151. 
 115. See A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(“[a]lthough, on this record, we are unable to conclude that the FDA's approval 
of Philips Roxane's application was not arbitrary and capricious, we are not 
required to vacate the approval . . . In this case, the FDA may well be able to 
explain why it reasonably determined that the Prescott Study demonstrated 
bioequivalency. In addition, vacating the rule approving the NADA would prove 
disruptive to Philips Roxane, which has relied on it in good faith for over 
thirteen years.”); see also Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed. Mine 
Safety and Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Relevant to the 
choice are the seriousness of the order's deficiencies (and thus the extent of 
doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an 
interim change that may itself be changed . . . The record before us does not 
appear to speak to the effects of an interim change—except in the sense that 
those effects include the safety effects of the order itself (and thus its 
substantive validity). As the record affords us no basis for concluding that the 
deficiencies of the order will prove substantively fatal, we remand the case but 
do not vacate.”); see also Md. Native Plant Soc’y v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
332 F. Supp. 2d 845, 863 (D. Md. 2004) (“Moreover, vacatur at this juncture 
would have a serious economic impact on the developer. As attested by Hunters 
Brooke LLC's general partner, Mohammed Tobah, the partnership stands to 
lose hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not more, if the uncertainty of a vacatur 
is introduced, even though the Corps may eventually be able to articulate 
sustainable reasons for its decision.”). 
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be forced to fashion remedies or damages due to the retroactive 
nature of vacating the regulation.116 
These cases are of particular relevance because they show 
that not only does the D.C. Circuit think of the potential effect of 
vacating before deciding to do so, but it is also aware of the 
possibility that a remedy may not be available due to prior 
reliance, and in such circumstances has chosen to remand 
without vacatur rather than vacate the rule.  The inference then 
would be that by vacating a regulation, the D.C. Circuit intended 
the vacatur to have retroactive effects and did not feel that the 
‘egg had been scrambled,’ so to speak. 
This retroactivity analysis can be applied to EGUs permitted 
under CAMR prior to New Jersey v. EPA as an example of the 
types of serious issues that the vacatur of agency regulations will 
affect.  In cases where the EGU has finished construction or no 
change can be made to the projected mercury and HAP emissions 
without a significant overhaul, it is conceivable that the courts 
may find no such remedy available; the egg may be scrambled in 
this situation.  However, given the time it takes to construct a 
typical EGU,117 and the timing of the New Jersey v. EPA decision 
with respect to the promulgation of CAMR (a little more than two 
years passed between the two), it does not appear likely that 
many plants, if any, would be beyond this point of no return in 
 
 116. See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97-98 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Normally when an agency so clearly violates the APA we 
would vacate its action—in this case its “non-rule rule”—and simply remand for 
the agency to start again. Unfortunately, because we denied preliminary relief 
in this case, the 2001 program was launched and crops were plowed under. The 
egg has been scrambled and there is no apparent way to restore the status quo 
ante. Appellants suggested that if we were to vacate, the Federal Court of 
Claims would have the responsibility of allocating damages.”); Milk Train, Inc. 
v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“As in Sugar Cane Growers 
Coop. where the Secretary had improperly disbursed large quantities of sugar to 
farmers across the country, who in turn had already plowed under their crops, 
the Secretary here has already disbursed the 1999 program moneys [sic] to 
numerous dairy producers throughout the country, and those moneys [sic] may 
not be recoverable three years later. Here, as there, the egg has been scrambled 
and there is no apparent way to restore the status quo ante.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 117. For example, according to Duke Energy, it began constructing the 
Cliffside Power Plant in January 2008, and Cliffside is not expected to be online 
until 2012. See Cliffside Steam Station Project Overview, DUKE ENERGY, 
http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/cliffside-overview.asp (last visited Nov. 
21, 2011). 
25
  
26 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
their construction.  To further understand the application of this 
analysis to the particulars of HAP emissions regulation, mercury 
in particular, and the implications of the vacatur of CAMR, it is 
important to first understand why mercury regulation is 
important and its history, then second, the ruling vacating CAMR 
in New Jersey v. EPA. 
III.  MERCURY 101 
The main type of mercury discussed in this article and 
emitted from EGUs is methylmercury.  Methylmercury affects 
neurological development and presents several health risks, 
particularly in a fetus or young child.118  Methylmercury poses a 
health hazard when ingested by pregnant women or by mothers 
with breastfeeding babies.119  The EPA states, “[i]t is estimated 
that more than 300,000 newborns each year may have increased 
risk of learning disabilities associated with in utero exposure to 
methylmercury.”120  Mercury emitted from power plants is 
deposited in lakes and oceans where it transforms into 
methylmercury.  It then bioaccumulates (moves itself up the food 
chain) into large fish.  Ingestion of fish is the primary method of 
human contact with methylmercury.121  The public health risks 
posed by mercury are well established and very serious. 
Mercury regulation in the United States, despite its recent 
notoriety and established risks, is in its infancy.  Mercury first 
gained major attention in the environmental community with the 
release of an EPA Mercury Study Report in 1997, a study 
required by the amendments to the CAA of 1990.122  In December 
of 2000, the EPA listed EGUs under section 112 of the CAA.  This 
listing required that HAPs, including mercury, emitted from 
these sources must be regulated with a MACT approach.123  Five 
years later, the EPA adopted CAMR on March 15, 2005 “to 
permanently cap and reduce mercury emissions from coal-fired 
 
 118. See Mercury: Human Exposure, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/ 
exposure.htm#meth (last updated Oct. 1, 2010). 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. U.S. EPA, MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-1 (1997). 
 123. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B). 
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power plants for the first time ever.”124  CAMR sparked intense 
debate between industry, which praised the rule for its flexibility 
and lack of economic impact, and environmentalists, who believed 
that the rule was not nearly strict enough, catered to big 
business, and was politically motivated.125 
CAMR was implemented under section 111 of the CAA.126  
This shifted mercury regulation to a cap and trade based 
regulatory scheme that alloted maximum amounts of mercury 
emissions to the states and tribes that regulate it.127  The 
additional effect of adopting CAMR was that in order to 
implement it, EPA first delisted EGUs from section 112 of the 
CAA, thus no longer requiring a MACT analysis to be completed 
prior to construction of any new major source or modification to 
EGUs.128  Under CAMR, the states and tribes were required to 
submit a report on their plan for distribution of the credits.  
Additionally, the credits could have been bought and sold 
between the plants, and excess credits could be saved for later 
use, so-called “banking.”129  The EPA claimed that when fully 
implemented, the proposed caps would have resulted in a 
decrease in mercury emissions by seventy percent.130  In addition 
to the initial cap, another cap would have been imposed in 2018; 
“new” power plants (those beginning construction after January 
30, 2004) would have been held to “stringent” performance 
standards as well as adherence to the caps.131 
Much of the criticism of CAMR concerned the switch from 
using section 112 to using section 111 for HAPs regulation from 
EGUs.  This change fueled the perception that the Bush 
Administration favored business interests over the environment 
 
 124. Clean Air Mercury Rule, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/CAMR/ (last 
updated Mar. 16, 2011). 
 125. Lauren Parry, Clean Air Rules of 2004: Motivation, Impacts, and 
Concerns, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 367, 390 (2005). 
 126. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
 127. Parry, supra note 125. 
 128. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
 129. N.C. DEP’T OF ENV’T AND NATural RES., DIV. OF AIR QUALITY, MERCURY 
EMISSIONS & MERCURY CONTROLS FOR COAL-FIRED ELECTRICAL UTIL. BOILERS II-
13 (2005) [hereinafter NCDENR]. 
 130. Clean Air Mercury Rule: Basic Information, U.S. EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/camr/basic.html (last updated March 16, 2011). 
 131. Id. 
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when crafting the rule.132  The regulations were generally well-
received by business because of the flexibility afforded them in a 
cap and trade system regulated by the states.133  While it is true 
that a cap and trade system might reduce mercury emissions 
nationally, environmentalists pointed to the fact that, unlike 
carbon and global warming for instance, mercury and other HAPs 
have very localized effects on the surrounding community.134  
Thus, a cap and trade system for regulating mercury would allow 
“hot spots” to develop where risks would be increased, and could 
also present several environmental justice issues.135 
Another concern is that the EPA may not have duly 
considered the risk to outlier populations, such as several Native 
American populations, that consume much higher than average 
amounts of fish in their daily diets.  The acceptable mercury 
emissions level established by EPA was based on an average 
person’s consumption of fish.  Thus, communities that rely 
heavily on fish in their diets may be more susceptible to the risks 
posed by mercury emissions that have made their way into native 
fish.136 
An additional criticism of the 2005 CAMR lies in the “race to 
the bottom” theory.137  Since the regulations in the cap and trade 
system, unlike applying MACT, are on a state-by-state basis, not 
all states are subject to them.  States that have extra emissions 
credits or are not required to adhere to the regulations might be 
enticed to recruit business based on their less stringent 
requirements.138 
Some states took action to refine EPA mercury emissions 
standards.  For example, North Carolina went through the 
 
 132. Parry, supra note 125, at 385. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Press Release, Dartmouth News, New Studies Link Mercury 
Pollution Hotspots to U.S. Coal-fired Power Plants and Other Sources (Jan. 9, 
2007), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~news/releases/2007/01/09.html.  
A map of mercury hot spots in North America is available at 
http://www.cec.org/Storage/49/4186_hotspots_en.pdf. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Catherine A. O’Neil, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, 
Contaminated Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 3, 9 (2000). 
 137. Parry, supra note 125, at 392. 
 138. Id. at 391. 
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process of developing its own supplementary mercury regulations 
to be used in addition to the CAMR.  The Department of Air 
Quality in North Carolina completed its Mercury Emissions and 
Mercury Controls for Coal-fired Electrical Utility Boilers report on 
September 1, 2005.  The stated goals of the report were to: 
(1) update issues related to monitoring and controlling mercury 
emissions from coal-fired generating units, (2) update control 
technology information, (3) provide estimates of cost to benefits of 
alternative strategies to reduce emissions of mercury, and (4) 
provide a recommendation to reduce the emission of mercury 
from coal-fired generating units.139 
The North Carolina report, which states that the North Carolina 
regulations are under formation by the Environmental 
Management Commission, provides an in-depth comparison 
between the cap and trade system favored by the EPA and the 
Bush Administration, and the MACT method favored by 
environmentalists as well as several states.  The report points out 
that both the flexibility and extra time provided by cap and trade 
to upgrade, and its trade policy, are benefits; however, the ability 
to “bank” credits may result in higher outputs in later years.140  
MACT, in the eyes of North Carolina, would provide more 
stringent regulations but might hinder smaller businesses that 
cannot afford the upgrades and would thus be hurt when no 
emissions trading is allowed.141  The conclusion of the report is 
that North Carolina should pursue a policy that “is at least as 
stringent as the CAMR and that also meets any additional 
requirements that the Environmental Management Commission 
deems appropriate for North Carolina.”142 
Not all states and organizations responded as open-mindedly 
to CAMR as North Carolina.  According to the North Carolina 
report: 
[s]election of Section 111 instead of Section 112 has resulted in 
ten states filing a lawsuit challenging EPA’s decision to revise its 
December 2000 regulatory finding that removed coal- and oil-
 
 139. NCDENR, supra note 129, at iv. 
 140. Id. at II-14. 
 141. Id. at II-14. 
 142. Id. at V-1. 
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fired electric utility steam generating units from the Section 
112(c) source category list. EPA’s revision rescinds the findings 
made in 2000 for utility air toxics that supported a requirement 
that utilities should install MACT, defined under the Clean Air 
Act. Four environmental groups have petitioned EPA to stay the 
revised regulatory determination pending the outcome of the 
states’ legal challenge.143 
While no stays were granted, the state lawsuits were heard and 
consolidated in New Jersey v. EPA.  This is discussed in detail in 
the next section of this article. 
IV.  THE HOLDING OF NEW JERSEY V. EPA 
New Jersey v. EPA presents a holding that fits the analysis of 
the retroactive effect of vacating agency regulations perfectly.  If 
the court were to vacate CAMR when they examined it, several 
potential issues of retroactivity would need to be resolved, 
especially if the holding were to be applied to coal-burning power 
plants permitted during the time period prior to the holding of 
the case.  The New Jersey v. EPA decision can be viewed in two 
parts.  First, the court needed to decide if the delisting of EGUs 
from section 112 of the CAA was legal.  Second, if the court found 
that the delisting was illegal, then it would need to determine 
what effect, if any, this holding would have on the recent addition 
of EGU regulation under section 111, i.e. the cap and trade 
program implemented by CAMR.144 
To answer the first question, the court examined the 
arguments of both the petitioners and the defendants.  The 
petitioners claimed that in order to delist EGUs from Section 112, 
the EPA was required to follow the procedures set forth in Section 
112(c)(9) of the CAA.145  Section 112(c)(9)(B)(ii) states that to 
delist a source category from section 112, the EPA must 
determine that “that emissions from no source in the category or 
subcategory concerned . . . exceed a level which is adequate to 
protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no 
adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from any 
 
 143. Id. at II-12. 
 144. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577-78 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 145. Id. at 577. 
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source[.]”146  The petitioners claimed that EPA had failed to 
follow this procedure and therefore the delisting was illegal; as 
the court noted several times, the EPA made no claim they had 
followed this procedure.147 
Instead, the EPA made several arguments as to why it was 
not required to follow the procedures set out in section 112(c)(9) 
when delisting EGUs from regulation under section 112.  EPA 
attempted to reach the Chevron step two level of deference for its 
interpretation of the statute by arguing that if under section 
112(n)(1)148 it found that EGUs should not be regulated under 
section 112, then section 112(c)(9) becomes ambiguous.149  
According to EPA, if section 112(c)(9) was ambiguous, EPA should 
be granted the Chevron level of heightened deference in its 
interpretation of the statute, 150 meaning that the interpretation 
not need be what the court interprets the statute to mean, 
instead it must only be a reasonable interpretation.  The court 
dismissed this argument, noting that: 
[S]ection 112(n)(1) governs how the Administrator decides 
whether to list EGUs; it says nothing about delisting EGUs, and 
the plain text of section 112(c)(9) specifies that it applies to the 
delisting of “any source.” In the context of the CAA, “the word 
‘any’ has an expansive meaning.” Moreover, where Congress 
wished to exempt EGUs from specific requirements of section 
112, it said so explicitly. For example, section 112(c)(6) expressly 
exempts EGUs from the strict deadlines imposed on other 
sources of certain pollutants. Furthermore, EPA concedes that 
listing EGUs under section 112(c) triggered application of some 
subparts of section 112, but provides no persuasive rationale for 
why the comprehensive delisting process of section 112(c)(9) does 
not also apply.151 
The court found that EPA was not entitled to the high degree of 
deference granted to an agency at step two of the Chevron 
 
 146. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii). 
 147. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 581-582. 
 148. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1). 
 149. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 150. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582. 
 151. Id.; see also Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
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analysis.  Rather, the court held that the question posed was 
specifically addressed by the statute, thus barring EPA from 
advancing beyond step one in a Chevron analysis.152 
The EPA’s second argument for not following the section 
112(c)(9) procedure was that an agency has an “inherent 
authority to reverse an earlier administrative determination or 
ruling where an agency has a principled basis for doing so.”153  
The court quickly disregarded this claim by noting that while 
such an authority is generally given to an agency to reverse an 
earlier agency decision, Congress has the power to limit this 
authority, and EPA cannot nullify this Congressional power.154  
The court stated: 
EPA may not construe [a] statute in a way that completely 
nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit its 
discretion.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 485 
(2001) . . . Indeed, EPA’s position would nullify section 112(c)(9) 
altogether, not just with regard to EGUs, for EPA is unable to 
explain how, if it were allowed to remove EGUs from the section 
112 list without regard to section 112(c)(9), it would not also have 
the authority to remove any other source by ignoring the 
statutory delisting process.155 
Finally, the EPA argued that it has previously delisted other 
sources from regulation under section 112 without following the 
procedure set forth in section 112(c)(9); therefore, it should be 
able to do so in the case at hand for EGUs.156  The court quickly 
dismissed this argument because “previous statutory violations 
cannot excuse the one now before the court.”157  Thus, since the 
procedures in section 112(c)(9) were not followed and EPA 
presented no persuasive argument as to why they need not be 
followed, the court vacated the delisting of EGUs from section 112 
of the CAA.158 
 
 152. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583; see also Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 153. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582 (citing Respondent’s Brief at 22) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 154. Id. at 582. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 583. 
 158. Id. 
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Having held that the delisting was illegal, the court needed 
to analyze what effect, if any, this holding would have on the 
recent CAMR EGU regulations promulgated under section 111 of 
the CAA.  The court, in its analysis of this question, relied on the 
EPA’s own interpretation of the CAA.159  This interpretation 
stated that a source regulated under section 112 could not 
concurrently be regulated under section 111.160  Relying on this 
principle, the court vacated CAMR since it was promulgated on 
the assumption that there would be no section 112 regulation of 
EGUs.  The court stated: 
[g]iven that these vital assumptions were incorrect, the court 
must vacate CAMR’s new source performance standards and 
remand them to EPA for reconsideration, for severance and 
affirmance of a portion of an administrative regulation is 
improper if there is ‘substantial doubt’ that the agency would 
have adopted the severed portion on its own.161 
The court leaves no doubt that it has vacated both the delisting of 
EGUs from section 112 and the subsequent CAMR regulations 
under section 111.  However, it does not address the implications 
of this vacatur, especially with regard to EGUs permitted during 
the time window in which section 112 was not applicable, and 
CAMR was considered governing law.  To examine the effects of 
the vacatur and its potential retroactive application as discussed 
in Section II, it is helpful to examine another case stemming from 
this decision which seeks to apply its ruling to a coal-burning 
power plant retroactively. 
V.  THE CLIFFSIDE POWER PLANT 
A. Background 
Duke Energy was permitted by the North Carolina 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR) 
on January 29, 2008 to construct the Cliffside Plant, an 800 
megawatt coal-burning power plant, outside of Rutherfordton, 
 
 159. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 583-84 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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N.C.162  Duke states that it began construction on the Cliffside 
plant on January 30, 2008,163 nine days before the February 8, 
2008, decision in New Jersey v. EPA.  Thus, according to Duke, 
section 112 of the CAA requiring it to conduct a MACT analysis 
for mercury and other HAPs does not apply to its construction of 
the Cliffside plant.164  A lawsuit filed in the federal court’s 
Western District of North Carolina claimed not that Duke’s 
permit was invalid, but that by not completing a MACT analysis 
and continuing construction, Duke was in direct violation of 
section 112 of the CAA.165 
The Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE), Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and Sierra Club first gave 
notice of their suit to Duke Energy in a letter dated May 6, 
2008.166  The letter stated that, by continuing ongoing 
construction without having conducted a MACT analysis, Duke 
was in violation of section 112(g)(2)(B).   Section 112(g)(2)(B) 
prohibits “contruct[ing]. . . any major source of [HAPs] unless the 
Administrator (or the State) determines that [MACT] emission 
limitation under this section for new sources will be met.”167  
Where no specific limitations have been established, as is the case 
for mercury, MACT “shall be made on a case by case basis.”168  
Section 304 of the CAA authorizes the authority for such a citizen 
suit against Duke.169 
 
 162. See Duke Cliffside Permits, N.C. DEP’T ENV’T & NATURAL RES. DIV. OF AIR 
QUALITY (July 2, 2009, 11:03 AM), http://daq.state.nc.us/permits/psd/ 
cliffside.shtml. 
 163. Letter from John Suttles, S. Envtl. Law Ctr., to Rick Roper, Manager, 
Cliffside Steam Station, Duke Energy (May 6, 2008) (on file with author). 
 164. See Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to 
Dismiss, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. 
108CV318, 2008 WL 7612965 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2008).  This argument is 
reminiscent of that made by Tennessee Valley Authority in Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill.  The Supreme Court invalidated the argument in that case; 
however, that case dealt with a statute of Congress applying not a judicial 
vacatur of an agency regulation. See also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 157-160 (1978). 
 165. See S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. 
1:08CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97485 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008). 
 166. Letter from John Suttles, supra note 163. 
 167. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
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NCDENR was obviously unsure of the implications of the 
holding in New Jersey v. EPA on the Cliffside Plant.  In a letter to 
Duke, dated June 2, 2008, NCDENR acknowledged that any 
plant now applying for a permit would be subject to the section 
112 requirements; however, “there is a debate whether a major 
source whose construction was permitted and begun prior to the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision and mandate, but whose construction will 
be completed for the most part after the date of mandate, is 
subject to the requirements of § 112(g).”170  The letter then 
encourages Duke to engage in a “public process” to determine the 
“maximum degree of reduction in emissions of HAPs” 
achievable.171  In response, Duke agreed to undergo a voluntary 
“MACT-like” process, but maintained that section 112(g) did not 
apply to them.172  While on its face this may seem as if the 
statute is being followed, the petitioners claimed that a “MACT-
like” voluntary process is no substitute for the statutory 
requirements of an actual MACT assessment, which involves 
public hearings and studies, and that section 112(g) did indeed 
apply to the Cliffside Plant.  Thus, two main questions were in 
need of answer in the suit: does section 112(g) apply to the 
Cliffside plant; and if it does, what is the proper remedy? 
 
 170. Letter from Keith Overcash, Dir., Div. of Air Quality, N.C. Dep’t of Env’t 
and Natural Res., to Rick Roper, Manager, Cliffside Steam Station, Duke 
Energy (Jun. 2, 2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/permits/psd/docs/ 
cliffside/Letter_Regarding_Cliffside_MACTs.pdf. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Letter from James L. Turner, President and Chief Operating Officer, U.S. 
Franchised Elec. & Gas, to Keith Overcash, Dir., Div. of Air Quality, N.C. Dept. 
of Env’t & Natural Res. (July 3, 2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/ 
permits/psd/docs/cliffside/Cover_Letter.pdf.  See also DUKE ENERGY, CASE-BY-
CASE MACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAPS, UNIT NO. 6 CLIFFSIDE STEAM STATION 
PROJECT 3-4 (2008), available at http://daq.state.nc.us/permits/psd/docs/cliffside/ 
Case-by-Case_MACT_Assessment-Final_07-03-08.pdf (presenting the results of 
Duke’s self- assessment of MACT for the Cliffside plane and asserting that 
MACT does not necessarily apply to the Cliffside plant); see also Reply Brief in 
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability and Standing 
at 11-12, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. Civ. 
108CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 53951 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 8, 2008) 
(Discussing the differences between a “MACT-like” process conducted by Duke 
and a formal MACT analysis governed by section 112 of the CAA) [hereinafter 
Reply to Summary Judgment, S. Alliance for Clean Energy]. 
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B. Petitioners’ Argument 
The petitioners’ claims that Duke must apply MACT for 
mercury and other HAPs to the Cliffside plant can be broken 
down into a three-part analysis.  First, despite the fact that 
section 112(g) is a preconstruction requirement, it still applies to 
the Cliffside plant post-construction commencement.173  Second, 
by vacating CAMR, section 112 retroactively applies to the 
Cliffside plant.174  Finally, because section 112 applies, Duke is 
required to conduct a formal MACT analysis; otherwise they are 
in violation of the CAA.175  For the purposes of this article, the 
second argument is by far the most relevant. 
The petitioners rely heavily upon the language used by the 
D.C. Circuit in New Jersey v. EPA to refute Duke’s claim that the 
holding ‘reinstated’ EGUs to be listed under section 112, pointing 
to the language used that “EGUs remain listed under section 
112.”176  Additionally, the petitioners address the case law 
discussed above.  The petitioners assert that judicial decisions 
should apply retroactively in regards to vacatur of agency 
regulations; in particular, they point to the National Fuel case as 
an example where the default presumption of a ruling against an 
agency regulation would be retroactive application.177 
C.  Duke’s Argument 
Duke’s argument is not that they have complied with section 
112 of the CAA.  Instead, Duke claims that the section should not 
apply to them at all in regards to the Cliffside plant.178  Duke’s 
argument that section 112 does not apply to the Cliffside plant 
can be broken into two primary parts.  First, Duke claims that 
section 112 should not apply to the Cliffside plant because the 
 
 173. Reply to Summary Judgment, S. Alliance for Clean Energy, supra note 
172, at 6-9. 
 174. Id. at 9-15. 
 175. Id. at 15-17. 
 176. Id. at 10; see also New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 177. Reply to Summary Judgment, S. Alliance for Clean Energy, supra note 
172, at 11-15. 
 178. Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 3-14, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 
No. Civ. 108CV318, 2008 WL 7612965 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2008). 
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relevant regulations do not apply to ongoing construction, but 
only to the commencement of construction, which Duke claims to 
have commenced prior to New Jersey v. EPA.179  Second, Duke 
claims that the courts cannot apply section 112(g) retroactively in 
this case.180  This second argument is most relevant to this 
article.181 
To argue that the court cannot apply section 112(g) and the 
ruling in New Jersey v. EPA retroactively, Duke makes a series of 
claims: (1) that to do so the court would be expanding the holding 
of New Jersey v. EPA; (2) that to do so would ignore the laws 
against retroactive imposition of liability; and (3) that case law 
asserts that an agency cannot make retroactive regulations 
without violating due process and by applying the holding of New 
Jersey v. EPA, the courts would be doing just that.182 
To support this argument, Duke relies primarily on two 
cases, Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital and Landgraf v. 
USI Film Products.183  Duke claims that applying section 112(g) 
to the Cliffside plant “represents a retroactive application of 
statutory and regulatory provisions, not a judicial decision”184 by 
relying on their assertion that New Jersey v. EPA reinstated 
EGUs to be listed under section 112(g) rather than affirmed that 
they remain listed, and Bowen, holding that an agency must 
make prospective regulations.185 
Additionally, Duke discounts the petitioners’ reading of 
National Fuel, stating that it “does not even represent a straight-
 
 179. Id. at 3-5. 
 180. Id. at 5-14. 
 181. In addition, Duke claimed that the petitioners lacked proper standing to 
bring suit, and that the suit was a collateral attack on the state’s permitting 
process.  Since neither argument is relevant to the analysis in this article and 
neither was successful, these arguments are not discussed at length in the 
discussion of Duke’s Motion to Dismiss. See id. at 14-25. See also S. Alliance for 
Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. Civ. 108CV318, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 97485 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008). 
 182. Reply Brief in Support of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 14-25, S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 
No. Civ. 108CV318, 2008 WL 7612965 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2008) [hereinafter 
Reply to Motion to Dismiss, S. Alliance for Clean Energy]. 
 183. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 184. Reply to Motion to Dismiss, S. Alliance for Clean Energy, supra note 182, 
at 10. 
 185. Id. 
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forward application of the judicial retroactivity doctrine, because 
the remedy . . . would have largely prospective effects.”186  
Instead, Duke relies on Landgraf and states that the “restriction 
on retroactivity Due Process imposes constrains all branches of 
the government, not just the legislative and executive.”187  Duke 
surmises its argument that section 112(g) cannot be applied to 
the Cliffside plant retroactively, again relying on the case law 
decisions that agencies cannot make retroactive regulations, and 
that finding for the petitioners in this case would be analogous to 
the judiciary doing just that as a surrogate of the agency claiming 
that “[j]udicial retroactivity cannot create liability for following 
then existing law.”188 
D. The Holding 
On December 2, 2008, the Western District of North Carolina 
published the holding of SACE v. Duke Energy.  The court 
granted the motion for summary judgment by the petitioners, and 
ordered that Duke complete the MACT analysis for mercury and 
other HAPs in sixty days or face a court-ordered injunction for 
ongoing construction of the Cliffside plant.189  The court contends 
that “the main issue to be decided in this case . . . [is] whether or 
not the requirements of Section 112(g)(2)(B) apply to the ongoing 
construction of Unit 6.”190  To reach a decision, the court cited 
National Fuel, Harper, and Beam to assert that when the D.C. 
Circuit vacated CAMR the effect of that holding was “that EGUs, 
including Defendant, remain listed under § 112 and subject to its 
provision.  This Court concludes that § 112(g)(2)(B) and 40 C.F.R. 
§ 63.40(b) were in effect at the time Duke began its construction 
of Cliffside Unit 6 and the completion of the MACT process was 
required before construction began.”191  Clearly, at least in the 
 
 186. Id. at 13. 
 187. Id. at 12; see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. 
 188. Id. at 16. 
 189. S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. Civ. 
108CV318, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97485, at *23-24 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2008). 
 190. Id. at 5. 
 191. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).  It should be noted that despite this ruling, 
Duke Energy has yet to begin the MACT analysis.  Duke now claims that they 
never should have been subject to section 112(g) in the first place, and they now 
contend that the Cliffside plant is not a “major source” under the statute, 
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case of the Western District of North Carolina, the court has held 
that the decision in New Jersey v. EPA should apply retroactively, 
forcing EGUs permitted while CAMR was considered valid law to 
conduct the MACT analysis for mercury and other HAPs with the 
same force as if it had always been the law and CAMR had never 
existed.192 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RETROACTIVE OR 
NON-RETROACTIVE APPLICATION 
One final note provides more evidence of the history of 
retroactive effects when vacating a rule.  Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,193 
which outlawed agencies from making retroactive rulemakings 
unless expressly authorized by Congress to do so, agencies would 
make regulations that became effective during the period the 
vacated regulation had controlled.  The intention was to negate 
the disruptive effect of the retroactive nature of vacatur.  While 
 
although Duke had previously identified the Cliffside plant as a “major source” 
for mercury and other HAPs.  They now contend that they had used inaccurate 
data when estimating the emissions and that the Cliffside plant is a “minor 
source” and thus is not required to apply MACT.  The NC DAQ has agreed with 
this conclusion and changed the Cliffside plant to minor source classification.  In 
response to this ruling, the federal case has been put on hold in lieu of suits over 
state matters such as this classification.  See Letter from James L. Turner, 
President and Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Franchised Elec. & Gas, to Keith 
Overcash, Dir., Div. of Air Quality, N.C. Dept. of Env’t & Natural Res. (Dec. 4, 
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_to_DAQ_12042008.pdf. 
 192. Since the holding of this case, both parties have filed appeals, with Duke 
questioning the holding and petitioners hoping for an injunction since North 
Carolina, at Duke’s request, has since reclassified the Cliffside plant as a minor 
source of HAPs so MACT analysis would not be necessary.  The reclassification 
of the Cliffside Plant as a minor source led to challenges of that decision and the 
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Administrative Hearings in North Carolina.  Thus the federal court applied the 
doctrine of abstention to no longer enforce its previous ruling since the state 
courts were now directly involved and the direct issue in the federal case about 
the MACT analysis was not.  See S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy 
Carolinas, LLC, No. 108CV318, 2009 WL 1940048 (W.D.N.C. July 2, 2009).  The 
court of appeals did find however, that the environmental plaintiffs had 
prevailed in the issue on some account.  Therefore, they were entitled to 
attorney’s fees.  See S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, 
LLC, No. 08-2370, 2011 WL 1421794 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 193. See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
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this practice is no longer legal, it does show that vacating a rule 
has a history of retroactive disruption.194 
In addition, the policy implication to an agency if regulation 
vacaturs were not given retroactive effect would be to effectively 
hand the agency significantly more power than we have seen in 
the past.  Because the available recourse when an agency crafts 
an illegal regulation is through the court system—a system filled 
with lengthy procedures and delays—agencies would effectively 
be able to craft any regulation they pleased, no matter how 
egregious, and those whom it benefited would be able to reap the 
rewards of such a regulation until it was vacated months if not 
years later.  When applied to the specific situation addressed in 
this article, it implies that EPA could craft a regulation stating 
that EGUs do not have to install any pollution control measures, 
and so long as an entity was permitted for construction before 
such a regulation was vacated by the courts, the EGU would be 
able to emit pollutants for years to come with no liability.  This is 
simply not sound public policy. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is a very strong case to be made that the judicial 
vacatur of an agency regulation should be applied retroactively 
when a remedy is available.  For example, the ruling in New 
Jersey v. EPA should be retroactively applied to EGUs permitted 
while CAMR was in effect prior to being vacated in New Jersey v. 
EPA, including the Duke Energy Cliffside plant.  The plain 
meaning of “vacate” implies that the law should be voided and set 
aside; courts have interpreted this to mean that it should be as if 
the vacated regulation never existed.195  The Supreme Court and 
D.C. Circuit have well-established case law supporting a strong 
presumption of retroactivity for decisions, the sole exceptions to 
this presumption exhibiting criteria that are not met in New 
Jersey v. EPA.196  This case law also includes statements 
supporting the fact that detrimental effects to a party should not 
 
 194. See id.; see also Levin, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing an increase in 
decisions employing remand without vacatur because retroactive rulemaking to 
prevent disruption caused by vacatur is no longer an available remedy). 
 195. See supra Part II-A. 
 196. See supra Part II-B. 
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be a determinative factor if a holding is applied retroactively.  
Furthermore, when making their decision, the D.C. Circuit had 
other options at their disposal, such as remand without vacatur 
(instead of completely vacating the regulation), which could 
prevent the disruption caused when a decision to vacate is 
retroactively applied.197  In this case, they chose not to apply any 
of these alternative remedies and therefore subjected the vacation 
to retroactive effect. 
While confusion remains among state departments of 
environment over whether or not to now require MACT for 
mercury and other HAPs from EGUs permitted prior to New 
Jersey v. EPA, at least one federal court has ruled that an EGU 
permitted during the time window after CAMR was promulgated 
and prior to its vacatur must retroactively apply section 112(g) of 
the CAA as if it had always been the governing law.198  Based on 
these observations, it is the conclusion of this article that any 
EGU permitted while CAMR was considered valid law is 
currently in violation of the CAA if they do not conduct the proper 
MACT analysis required by section 112 of the CAA for mercury 
and other HAPs.  This result is derived from the conclusion that 
when agency regulations are ruled illegal by a court of law, both 
case law and public policy support the notion that these 
regulations carry no validity during the period prior to their 
vacation. 
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